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a b s t r a c t
Physical layer security has attracted lots of attention with the expansion of wireless devices to the edge networks
in recent years. Due to limited authentication mechanisms, MAC spooﬁng attack, also known as the identity attack, threatens wireless systems. In this paper, we study a new type of MAC spooﬁng attack, the virtual MAC
spooﬁng attack, in a tight environment with strong spatial similarities, which can create multiple counterfeits entities powered by the virtualization technologies to interrupt regular services. We develop a system to eﬀectively
detect such virtual MAC spooﬁng attacks via the deep learning method as a countermeasure. A deep convolutional neural network is constructed to analyze signal level information extracted from Channel State Information
(CSI) between the communication peers to provide additional authentication protection at the physical layer. A
signiﬁcant merit of the proposed detection system is that this system can distinguish two diﬀerent devices even at
the same location, which was not well addressed by the existing approaches. Our extensive experimental results
demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the system with an average detection accuracy of 95%, even when devices are
co-located.

1. Introduction
In the past decade, the ubiquitous expansion of smart home applications allow a mass of IoT devices to be connected to the Internet. The
majority of devices use WiFi as the primary way for communications.
Most WiFi networks nowadays use WiFi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) or
IEEE 802.11i to protect users’ security. Nevertheless, such prior authentication is vulnerable to physical layer spooﬁng attacks in which an inside spoofer can claim to be another node by using the Media Access
Control (MAC) address of the latter. Attackers can easily obtain other
users physical layer information by using the pervasive public tools on
the 802.11 commodity hardware [1] or simply sniﬃng the ARP packets in the network, which makes it feasible for ordinary users to alter
the device’s hardware-level parameters in wireless networks, as well as
launching various identity theft attacks.
Launching identity attacks allows the attacker to obtain an illegal advantage in the Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks or Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks while the system admin cannot identify the real owner of
the corresponding MAC address. When multiple devices in the local network use the same MAC address, the collision of the MAC address will
cause all devices sharing the same MAC address to be denied from the
regular services. Fig. 1 illustrates the traditional MAC spooﬁng attack in
a local wireless network, in which an attacker, Eve, forges its MAC address to masquerade as another benign node, Bob. Then Eve can deceive
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the Access Point (AP), disrupt the regular network connections of Bob,
or advertise false services to nearby mobile stations. However, due to
the collision of the MAC address with Bob, Eve cannot maintain a good
connection with AP, either.
There are several physical layer proprieties that can be utilized for
ﬁngerprinting devices, which can be further used to detect MAC spoofing attacks, i.e., traditional power features and ﬁner-grained channel
response. Traditional power features include Received Signal Strengths
(RSS) and Received Signal Strength Indicators (RSSI), and ﬁner-grained
channel response include Channel State Information (CSI). RSSI was
considered in many works in physical layer authentication [2–4] as it
reveals the attenuation of radio signal during the propagation. However, RSS and RSSI are incapable of providing robust and stable signal
features in complex indoor environments due to multipath fading [5].
Beneﬁting from the adoption of Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) technology since IEEE 802.11n, channel response can
be extracted from the oﬀ-the-shelf WiFi receivers to indicate the amplitudes and phases of every subcarrier between the communication peers.
Therefore, CSI leverages the ﬁner-grained power feature to discriminate
multipath characteristics.
In [6], the authors proposed a CSI-based approach called Proﬁle
Matching Authenticator (ProMA), to detect traditional MAC spooﬁng
attacks. It utilizes the CSI amplitude information to build a proﬁle for
each legitimate device in the network and then detect MAC spooﬁng by
looking at these proﬁles. This method relies on the fact that the ampli-
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CSI, VMASC automatically extracts features to classify devices through
a trained Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN). VMASC has several merits. First, it can distinguish the devices even at the same location through
using both the amplitude and the phase information of CSI. Second,
VMASC is very robust and works well even under severe communication environments. It also does not need any a priori information of
devices, such as collecting the proﬁles of devices in previous studies. Finally, VMASC does not need to use an expensive and high-resolution signal processing analyzer. It only uses oﬀ-the-shelf devices. The proposed
VMASC achieves an average of 95% accuracy in various environments.
It can be used for practical applications such as being added into the
administrator’s toolbox of a wireless network to eﬀectively detect MAC
spoofers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our
approach to distinguish co-locating devices, a key challenge in detect of
MAC spoofers. Section 3 describes the system architecture of VMASC.
Section 4 presents performance evaluations and Section 5 concludes the
paper.

Fig. 1. Illustration of the traditional MAC spooﬁng attack.

tudes of CSI from devices at diﬀerent positions are diﬀerent. Hence, the
attackers who forge another node’s MAC at a diﬀerent location can be
detected since the CSI amplitude does not match the proﬁle constructed
for any legitimate user. Nevertheless, the CSI amplitudes of two devices
at the same location are generally similar. Hence this approach has difﬁculty distinguishing two legitimate devices at the same location, i.e.,
one of them would be falsely alarmed as a MAC spooﬁng attacker and
vice versa. Moreover, the CSI amplitude from the same location may
vary signiﬁcantly over time.
In addition to the issues discussed above, those existing methods for
MAC spooﬁng detection face even more challenges for a new type of
MAC spooﬁng attack termed virtual MAC spooﬁng attack in this paper.
Recently, the development of network virtualization techniques [7–9],
especially the MAC layer virtualization [10], enables the virtual MAC
spooﬁng attack. With this attack, an attacker can launch massive MAC
ﬂooding attacks [8] to disrupt a large-scale network to cause a severe
denial of service while the attacker can still maintain the connection to
the access point. For example, as shown in Fig. 2, Eve is the attacker
who creates two virtualized interfaces to forge the MAC addresses of
Alice and Bob simultaneously. Although Alice and Bob are suﬀering
from the potential packet loss due to the MAC collision, Eve can still
use its unique MAC address to maintain the regular connection. Virtual MAC technology also enables malicious users to demultiplex the
network traﬃc by dynamically scheduling packets to be transmitted on
diﬀerent virtualized interfaces to reshape the original traﬃc, which can
conceal malicious network activities and evade the intrusion detection
system [10,11]. Therefore, it is rather challenging to detect virtual MAC
spooﬁng using the existing methods.
In this paper, we propose a virtual MAC spooﬁng detection scheme
termed Virtual MAC Spooﬁng deteCtor (VMASC), utilizing the Channel
State Information (CSI) and the deep learning technique. VMASC can
eﬀectively detect both MAC and virtual MAC spooﬁng attacks. Specifically, based on the amplitude and phase information extracted from

2. Distinguish co-locating devices
The biggest challenge in MAC spooﬁng detection is how to distinguish devices that are at the same location. VMASC exploits two measurements of CSI to achieve this objective: 1) both the amplitude and
the phase information in CSI, and 2) the CSI error or variance of NICs.
Next we brieﬂy introduce these two measurements.
The CSI is a ﬁne-grained channel information that can be often provided by NICs. In the rest of the paper, for the ease of description, we
assume the wireless network is a WiFi network using the OFDM modulation. However, our approach is applicable to other wireless networks
where the CSI can be obtained.
With the OFDM modulation, the data stream is encoded on multiple
orthogonal subcarriers over the entire spectrum band. For example, in
802.11n 20Mhz non-High Throughput mode, each WiFi channel contains 56 subcarriers, and in 802.11n 40Mhz High Throughput mode,
each WiFi channel contains 114 subcarriers. The quantiﬁed channel frequency response for each subcarrier between each transmitter antenna
and each received antenna can be obtained by the oﬀ-the-shelf NICs such
as Atheros 9462 [12]. The frequency domain response in the OFDM system can be described as follows.
Y𝑠 = 𝑠 X𝑠 + N𝑠 ,

(1)

where Y𝑠 and X𝑠 represent the received and the transmitted signal vectors on subcarrier 𝑠, respectively, 𝑠 is the CSI on subcarrier 𝑠, and N𝑠
is the noise vector on subcarrier 𝑠. When MIMO communication (𝑁𝑇
number of transmit antenna and 𝑁𝑅 number of receive antenna) is engaged, 𝑠 is an 𝑁𝑇 × 𝑁𝑅 matrix representing the channel frequency
information on a subcarrier. For example, the Atheros NIC supports

Fig. 2. Illustration of the virtual MAC spooﬁng attack.
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Fig. 3. CSI of 20 packet transmissions from two devices at the same location, a) amplitude, b) amplitude and phase.

802.11n with 20Mhz/40Mhz bands at the 2.4Ghz/5Ghz frequency and
is equipped with two antennas on each NIC to collect CSI for each transmitted packet. Let 𝑁𝑆 represent the number of subcarriers in OFDM. It
is dynamically adjusted by the NIC between 56 and 114 based on the
condition of the wireless environment. The CSI on each subcarrier is a
complex number and it refers to the channel properties such as the channel frequency response of a communication frequency band. Moreover,
each CSI value consists of both the amplitude response and the phase
response on each subcarrier. Thus, it can be deﬁned as
|
|
̇ (𝑛𝑟 ,𝑛𝑡 ,𝑛𝑠 ) = |(𝑛𝑟 ,𝑛𝑡 ,𝑛𝑠 ) | exp
|
|

{

𝑗∠(𝑛𝑟 ,𝑛𝑡 ,𝑛𝑠

)}

,

(2)

where 𝑛𝑟 indicates the 𝑟-th receive antenna, 𝑛𝑡 indicates the 𝑡-th transmit
|
|
antenna, and 𝑛𝑠 indicates the 𝑠-th subcarrier. |(𝑛𝑟 ,𝑛𝑡 ,𝑛𝑠 ) | is the amplitude
|
|
response and ∠(𝑛𝑟 ,𝑛𝑡 ,𝑛𝑠 ) is the phase response of a subcarrier, respectively.
To illustrate our motivation to use both the amplitude and the phase
of CSI to distinguish co-locating devices, instead of simply using the amplitude of CSI, we plot the CSI amplitude and the full CSI on 56 subcarriers in Fig. 3 for 20 packets transmissions from two co-locating devices.
Fig. 3(a) shows that the amplitude of CSI samples from two devices,
Dev1 and Dev2, at the same location. We can clearly see that with both
the amplitude and the phase, it is easier to distinguish the two devices,
e.g., the CSI samples of Dev 2 (blue dots) are predominantly in the lower
half of the complex plane in Fig. 3(b), while the CSI samples of Dev1
(red dots) are more evenly distributed in both the lower and the upper
half of the complex plane. Relying solely on the amplitude can have
diﬃculty to distinguish the two devices as the CSI amplitudes of the
two devices are similar in most subcarriers. Furthermore, the beneﬁt
of using both the amplitude and the phase is that the phase information extracted from the CSI is more sensitive to reveal the variations of
hardware imperfections, due to the non-linear errors introduced [13].
During the manufacturing process of the NICs, there are always imperfections introduced such that two NICs are not exactly the same in
terms of signal transmission [13]. In other words, even the CSIs of the
packet transmissions of two NICs of the same type at the same location, same time, and same frequency exhibit some variance. Similarly,
in [13], the authors conduct an extensive analysis on the characteristics of the nonlinear errors on the channel frequency response introduced by the hardware imperfections. Such variance is caused by imperfections of the power ampliﬁer, carrier frequency alignment, sampling
frequency alignment, undesirable packet detection oﬀset, and phaselocked loop oﬀset [13]. Denote 𝛿𝑠,𝑙 as the error introduced by device 𝑙 on

Fig. 4. VMASC architecture.

subcarrier 𝑠. Then, the actual CSI on subcarrier 𝑠 is,
̂𝑠,𝑝 = 𝑠,𝑝 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑙 .

(3)

where 𝑠,𝑝 is the theoretical CSI for the 𝑝-th packet of device 𝑙 on 𝑠-th
subcarrier. We can rewrite (3) as follows:
}
|
| {
(4)
̂𝑠,𝑝 = |𝑠,𝑝 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑙 |𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝑗∠(𝑠,𝑝 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑙 )
|
|
Such device-related CSI errors or variance due to imperfections of NICs
is utilized by VMASC to identify the uniqueness of hardware and further
diﬀerentiate hardware.
In the next section, we present a deep convolutional neural network
that exploits the CSI errors caused by hardware imperfections, and the
full CSI information extracted from the packet transmissions, to detect
the virtual MAC spooﬁng attack.
3. Deep virtual MAC spooﬁng detector (VMASC)
The architecture of VMASC is shown in Fig. 4. We assume all devices
are equipped with an oﬀ-the-shelf Atheros NIC, which can read CSI data.
3
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Fig. 5. The CNN structure used in VMASC.

The main idea of this design is to examine the CSI from two packets
and use a deep learning classiﬁer as the detector to identify whether
the MAC addresses associated with the two packets originated from the
same physical device.
3.1. Training data gathering process
To collect training data, CSI samples from all incoming packets
are recorded at the AP (admin). However, the CSI extracted for each
packet does not contain any upper layer information such as the
source/destination MAC or IP address associated with its originated device, thus we need to align all the collected CSI with the traﬃc log and
label each CSI with a right device label before compiling the training
data.
Once we have collected the aligned CSI information, we compile the
training data as follows. We ﬁrst subtract the CSI from any two consecutive data packets (e.g., packet 𝑗 and 𝑗 + 1), and record this CSI subtraction result and a corresponding label as one training data sample.
The label value is assigned as follows. If the two consecutive packets are
actually sent from the same device, the label is 0; otherwise, the label is
1. Let ̂ 𝑠,𝑗 denote the CSI subtraction result on the 𝑠th subcarrier of the
𝑗th data in the training dataset, which can be expressed as
̂ 𝑠,𝑗 = ̂𝑠,𝑗 − ̂𝑠,𝑗+1 = (𝑠,𝑗 − 𝑠,𝑗+1 ) + (𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗 − 𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗+1 )

Fig. 6. Comparison of detection accuracy, a) MAC spooﬁng b) virtual MAC
spooﬁng.

or the same device. CNNs have been proven to be very successful in
computer vision [14–16]. By concatenating several convolutional layers, CNNs can extract complex features from data. In contrast to statistical learning which requires hand-crafted features, convolutional layers
are automatic feature extractors so the neural network can learn a highlevel abstraction from data.
Here, packets from a unique device are identiﬁed by the CSI subcarrier information. Due to the dynamics of the wireless channel, these
signatures also exhibit high temporal volatility that makes any predetermined feature futile. To extract subtle features from CSI on the
packets, CNN is an ideal candidate. The original designs for image classiﬁcation adopt 2D ﬁlters on the image to extract spatial features such
as edges, contour, and angle. Here, the CSI input data has a size of
4 × 2 × 56, where 56 is the number of OFDM subcarriers adopted during the transmission, 4 is the four pairs of transmitting and receiving
antennas, and 2 indicates the two components of the CSI, i.e., the amplitude and the phase values, as illustrated in Fig. 5. To extend CNN for
our purpose, 1D ﬁlters are used. For example, 3 × 1 ﬁlter will convolve
on three data points each time along with the frequency domain (subcarrier) of each transmit and receive antenna pair to explore the unique
hardware imperfection. We also verify that using 2D ﬁlters would lead
to the performance degradation to be explained in Section 4.3.
Moreover, VMASC needs to use 1D ﬁlter to convolve on both the
amplitude and phase information. The amplitude and phase extracted
from each CSI sample depict the attenuation and the propagation delay
of the signal that travels through a multipath environment. Since each of
them only reveals partial traits of hardware diﬀerence introduced in the
channel frequency response, we have to construct the training dataset
based on both the amplitude and the phase to avoid the performance
degradation. We have conducted extensive experiments to evaluate the
performance when only the amplitude or the phase is used, as described
in Section 4.3.
VMASC also uses a max pooling layer after some convolutional layers to reduce the dimensions to facilitate the learning process. Note that
convolutions over CSI received from multiple packets in the time domain are not feasible as the packets could come from diﬀerent devices
in a mixed pattern. Convolution over such information from diﬀerent
devices does not contribute to the learning process.

(5)

where 𝑗 ∈ [1, 𝑁 − 1], 𝑁 is the total number of packets collected for training, 𝑙𝑗 denotes the device that sends packet 𝑗, and 𝑙𝑗+1 denotes the device
that sends packet 𝑗 + 1, respectively.
Based on the spatial property and hardware diﬀerence, we have three
scenarios as follows.
1. If packets 𝑗 and 𝑗 + 1 are sent from the same device, the spatial property and hardware characteristic should be stationary within the period of the short inter-packet interval. Thus we have 𝑠,𝑗 ≊ 𝑠,𝑗+1 and
𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗 ≊ 𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗+1 based on the uniqueness and imperfection features mentioned in the preceding section.
2. If packets 𝑗 and 𝑗 + 1 are sent from two devices at two diﬀerent locations, the spatial property and hardware characteristics should be
diﬀerent. Thus we should have 𝑠,𝑗 ≠ 𝑠,𝑗+1 and 𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗 ≠ 𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗+1 .
3. If packets 𝑗 and 𝑗 + 1 are sent from two devices at the same location
or at very close locations, the spatial property between two packets
should be similar but the hardware imperfections are still diﬀerent.
We should have 𝑠,𝑗 ≊ 𝑠,𝑗+1 and 𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗 ≠ 𝛿𝑠,𝑙𝑗+1 .
These scenarios indicate that,
𝑠,𝑗 (Scenario 1) ≪ 𝑠,𝑗 (Scenario 3) < 𝑠,𝑗 (Scenario 2)

(6)

Noted that Eq. (6) shows that even in the extreme scenario where the
attacker is co-located with a benign user in the network, VMASC can
still detect it.
3.2. Attack detection
VMASC uses the convolutional neural network (CNN) to classify if a
data sample (the CSI diﬀerence of two packets) is from two devices
4
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Fig. 7. a) Comparison of detection accuracy between ProMA and VMASC, b) comparison of detection accuracy between diﬀerent input features, “Amp” means CSI
amplitude, “Phz” means CSI phase, c) CNN performance with diﬀerent ﬁlter sizes to detect virtual MAC spooﬁng.

We propose several CNN architectures. For brevity, a 4-layer CNN
is denoted as Conv(32)-MaxPooling-Conv(64)-MaxPooling-Conv(256)Dense(64)-Softmax, in which there are three Conv layers with 32, 64,
and 256 ﬁlters respectively and one densely connected layer with 64
activations. We choose 3 Conv layers because it can achieve a higher
accuracy than the network with 2 Conv layers and consume less computation resources than 4 Conv network (Table 1 in Section 4.3.2), thus
balance between the detection accuracy and resource consumption. The
ﬁnal softmax function projects the multi-dimensional output with arbitrary values into probabilities. If the ﬁnal output is 0, two packets are
sent from the same physical device, and vice versa. From the results, the
attacker will be detected if any two packets with diﬀerent hardware signatures claim the same MAC address (traditional MAC spooﬁng attack)
or multiple packets with diﬀerent MAC addresses are identiﬁed from the
same device (virtual MAC spooﬁng attack).

increases as the neural network gets deeper. The evaluation is based on
this structure and we leave the development of an optimal structure to
the future work.
4.2. Data collection
We collect the training and testing data from arbitrary locations in
each experiment scenario for 10 minutes. When the system is under the
traditional MAC spooﬁng attack, we assume that the network administrator does not have the knowledge of the attackers’ physical layer
information since the attackers are not present during the training process (administrators can always conduct training in a controllable setting). Thus, the training dataset is composed of any two consecutive
data packets from the benign users (exclude attackers). For virtual MAC
spooﬁng, an attacker can either create virtual network interfaces for
“benign” purposes as camouﬂage or spoof other users’ MAC to conduct
malicious activities. Thus, the training data for virtual MAC spooﬁng
is composed of any two consecutive data packets from all the devices
(including the attacker).

4. Performance evaluation
In this section, we present the performance evaluation in diﬀerent
experiment environments.

4.3. Experimental results
4.1. Experimental setup
4.3.1. Detection performance
We ﬁrst evaluate the performance under two scenarios in terms of the
detection rate, which is deﬁned as the total number of correctly labeled
two-packet tuples divided by the total number of two-packet tuples. The
detection ratio of our proposed system is over 90% against both traditional and virtual MAC address spooﬁng attacks. We ﬁrst compare the
performance of VMASC using CNN versus the one using the traditional
learning technique, Support Vector Machine (SVM). We also compare
the performance of VMASC with the ProMA approach in [6].
Comparison with SVM: Fig. 7 shows the overall performance of the
detection accuracy when using SVM and CNN, respectively, for VMASC,
in two diﬀerent attacking scenarios and diﬀerent environments (i.e., an
empty room, and a complex lab, respectively). In Fig. 7, we can easily observe that the average testing accuracy using the SVM classiﬁer
is low (about 50%) and the CNN reaches very high classiﬁcation accuracy (around 95%). It demonstrates the power of CNN as an eﬀective feature extractor compared to SVM even on CSI. Further, under the
same attacking scenario, the accuracy of CNN in the LoS environment
is slightly higher than the accuracy obtained under the complex environment. Such performance degradation is caused by the rapid change
of spatial diversity on each subcarrier with the deﬂection and multiple
paths of the transmitted signal. Moreover, when we compare the CNN
result between diﬀerent attacking scenarios, it is obvious that the overall detection accuracy for a system with more information is relatively
higher compared to the one for a system with limited information.
Comparison with ProMA: We compare the performance of VMASC
with the one of ProMA in [6] in Fig.. Under the co-located environment,

Our system has 3 major components, AP, hosted by a Dell Workstation; two Dell Laptops, with one as the benign node and the other as
the attacker (already inﬁltrated and authenticated). All three devices
are equipped with Atheros NICs with a modiﬁed driver to catalog CSI
values. The transmitter and receiver both have two antennas. The AP
will report the CSI value for each incoming packet associated with a
MAC address. To implement the virtual MAC address spooﬁng attack,
the attacker’s device will create multiple virtual MAC addresses.
We have conducted experiments in various scenarios. The ﬁrst scenario is a strong Line-of-Sight (LoS) environment and another scenario
is a complex environment with obstacles between devices. In LoS, all
mobile devices and the attacker reside in an empty room and send data
to an access point at their own speeds. The distance between the access
point and the devices are within 1 m. The purpose of this setting is to
mitigate the noise due to the multi-paths of the signal transmission and
CSI variation caused by the spatial diversity from diﬀerent locations. We
arbitrarily selected 20 positions in the room for testing. To make the experiments more practical, we also deployed the system in a complex lab
with obstacles, where devices are randomly distributed in a 10 × 5 𝑚2
area. The obstacles would block most of LoS paths and form a complex
radio propagation environment. One position is selected for training and
30 positions are randomly selected for testing. The training data consists
of 20,000 CSI samples and the testing data has 10,000 samples. The deep
learning framework is implemented on Tensorﬂow [17]. We develop a
4-layer CNN structure of Conv(32)-MaxPooling-Conv(64)-MaxPoolingConv(256)-MaxPooling-Dense(64)-Softmax, where the number of ﬁlters
5
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Table 1
Detection accuracy vs. time cost with diﬀerent number
of CNN layers.
Core Layer

Average Accuracy

Time for 10 epochs

1×Cov
2×Cov
3×Cov
4×Cov

0.83
0.87
0.94
0.96

26.63s
53.14s
113.14s
240.964s

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a Channel State Information (CSI)
based virtual MAC spooﬁng detector using the deep learning technology.
Compared with existing approaches, VMASC can eﬀectively distinguish
two devices at the same location, using both the amplitude and phase
information of CSI, and the CSI errors or variations caused by imperfections of the hardware. Extensive experiments have been conducted in
various environments and the results demonstrate the eﬀectiveness and
robustness of VMASC compared with a previous approach.

ProMA results in a lower accuracy due to the spatial similarity between
the attacker and benign users. When testing from randomly selected locations, both methods have good performance but VMASC beats ProMA
in all the scenarios.
Comparison with Diﬀerent Features: We also compare the average accuracy with diﬀerent feature inputs in Fig. based on the same
randomly selected data sets which cover all possible locations of the attacker. In the ﬁgure, “Amp” denotes amplitude and “Phz” denotes phase.
We evaluate the performance when the CSI amplitude, phase, or both
are used as CNN input. From the results we can tell that the performance
of the CSI amplitude based detector can reach a higher accuracy than the
purely phase based detector. This performance degradation is caused by
the limited range of features when only the phase is involved. The range
of each phase is within [−𝜋, 𝜋] which is not as wide as the range of amplitude on each subcarrier. However, once both features are combined
together, the phase information can better help to identify the variance
belonging to each device’s hardware.

Declaration of Competing Interest
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4.3.2. Fine-tuning the CNN structure
We further examine the system performance by varying the CNN
structure with a diﬀerent ﬁlter size and number of CNN layers. Fig.
shows the results of detection accuracy over all the testing samples. We
observe that the best accuracy is achieved with ﬁlter sizes of 5 × 1 and
7 × 1. The choice of ﬁlter size is important. A small ﬁlter size (3 × 1) cannot capture features across more CSI subcarriers whereas a large ﬁlter
size would unwittingly introduce more ﬂuctuations/noise into a single
convolution. Here, the results show that both 1D ﬁlters of sizes 5, or 7
achieve comparable performance. Fig. also illustrates the performance
when 2D ﬁlters are used (ﬁlters 5 × 3 and 7 × 3). We can see that those
results are severely degraded compared to the accuracy using 1D ﬁlters. Unlike image classiﬁcation, where pixels have spatial correlations
in a 2D plane, the secondary dimension in CSI data would bring irrelevant information into the feature extraction process and cause signiﬁcant reeducation of accuracy for over 10%. Moreover, Table 1 compares
the detection accuracy vs. time cost with a diﬀerent number of convolution layers. From the table we can tell that with the increase of convolution layers in the neural network, the performance will be increased.
However, the trade-oﬀ is obvious, resource consumption. With the same
computation capability, the system with 4 convolution layers takes 240s
to process 1 sample data whereas the system with 3 convolution layer
just needs half of the time while achieving a comparable accuracy. Thus,
to balance resource consumption and overall performance, we adopt the
neural network with 3 convolution layers and 5 × 1 ﬁlter in the experiments.
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